Having assumed that there exists an absolutist standard for moral truth, it is useful to consider some epistemological stances as to what this standard is. Two popular possibilities are the moral correspondence theory, and the coherence theory. The moral correspondence theory denotes that independent, objective moral realities that exist, and when we say that action X is good, the truth of this statement rests in its correspondence with this external reality. In other words, if action X really is good in reality, this statement is true for us, and through correspondence to an external reality, we can discover this reality and use it to build an absolute moral code that is true in an epistemological sense. Critics of this theory argue that since there is no way to access this external reality, correspondence theory becomes meaningless (Young, 2018). At best, we can make sure that our moral code is coherent with our beliefs about the world around us (Ibid). The coherence theory is practically appealing, as it allows moral philosophers to set up a code that is practically coherent and “makes sense.”

However, there is one glaring problem. Both conceptions of morality do not sufficiently motivate us towards a good action. Knowing that honesty is practically coherent with what we believe or even that it exists externally as a “good” does not sufficiently drive us towards it, and only leads us to further ask, “why is it good to do something good?”, in a formulation of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1903). Within this criticism is an inherent human instinct, that there must always be a reason to choose to do an action, otherwise that choice is arbitrary (Shomali, 2001, pg 205), and this is what makes an action “good”. By another formulation, an action is always “good for…” a particular reason or end (Korsgaard, 2014, pg 411-2). Korsgaard dubs this as procedural realism (Bagnoli, 2017), in which to get to a particular end, there is a correct procedure to do so, and a real, objective relationship between an end and the best way to get us to that end; a hypothetical imperative (Korsgaard, 2019, pg 98). In other words, “good” can be defined objectively as the best way to get to a particular desired end.

Korsgaard is criticised for this view for being vulnerable to the regress of ends, where it is not logically necessary that an end be valuable itself (Bagnoli, 2017 edition). But this criticism only reinforces the Aristotelian telos, in which each end is desired for an end in itself, and Aristotle himself agrees that an infinite regress would lead to empty desire and baseless choices. Further, there also cannot be two or multiple final ends; how does one prioritise one end over another in times of conflict? This leads us to the only other option; there must be a final end that is desired for its own self.

This final end is, according to Aristotle, is one’s own eudaimonia (Vitterso, pg 71). Shomali (2001, pg 201-35) reaches this same conclusion but calls this concept “self-love”. He describes that in the analysis of every choice, there is the search for self-interest: one priorities one’s own child over someone else’s, one’s own nation in times of war, one’s own humanity over the animal and plant kingdom. However, this does not need to culminate in a hedonism that searches for our own base pleasures above all else. Many including Aristotle allude to higher, abstract pleasures such as being loved, mental wellbeing, self-confidence. It is claimed by many that the highest and deepest desire we have is to fulfil our human potential; to realise our nature and to be the best versions of ourselves (Vitterso, 2016, pg 29. If we dig deep within our motivations, there is nothing greater in our self-interest than to be the best version of ourselves, and this is what Aristotle refers to as eudaimonia. This is the nature fulfilment theory and is found in Greek, Roman and a variety of contemporary philosophy (Ibid). It has also been named the function theory: Aristotle and Plato argue that we must determine what the human being is in order to determine the virtues that they should include in their moral code t

Further to this, Shomali (2001, pg 229-31) argues that there is a consistent human nature that is common to all humans across all periods and societies. For example, all humans intrinsically desire perfection, truth and beauty. If this was not so, if human nature was not an objective, consistent human reality, “there would be no places for disciplines such as education, psychology sociology…[which] presuppose that humans are similar and behave similarly in similar conditions.” (Shomali, 2011, pg 231) It therefore follows that the actualisation of the human nature is consistent in all humans across all periods and societies.

This arrives us at our absolutist standards. Any character trait, behaviour or action that results in eudaimonia (qua the realisation of one’s own human nature, and the best possible version of oneself) is classified as moral. But this is insufficient, as this could lead to infinite moral codes, all of which would reach some level of eudaimonia. What the constructivist (of the procedural realist variety) lends to this discussion is that the “moral” is the best procedure, the best and quickest way to achieve the most eudaimonia, of which there must be only one way. This real, objective relationship between the “moral” – the correct procedure – and the final end – eudaimonia – defines our absolute standard between different reference frameworks, and allows us to choose one superior moral code that is not relative to a particular society, but is a justified correct path towards fulfilling our human nature, in which the moral virtues developed become constituents of that eudaimonia as well as being instrumentally related to reaching it (Kristjansson, 2015, pg 26)

It is important to appreciate that identifying both one’s nature and the best way to actualise it is not without its challenges. However, the presence of a common human nature serves as a non-context dependent reality for psychological, empirical and philosophical research to correspond to, and so at the very least, there is a reality that can be uncovered, even if the details of this is outside the scope of this paper. The person with theological beliefs has the easier job, for they believe that God in His infinite knowledge and perfection is best served to tell us what our nature is and what it requires for its actualisation. Here, revelation and scripture serve as the recipe book of moral and immoral acts, similar to the Aristotelian who uses the Nichomachean Ethics as his recipe book to formulate an absolute moral code to live by and use to reach one’s full potential.

As mentioned before, the absolutist account of morality explains why we disagree in moral conflict so vehemently, and for the child learning about character, will fit his experience of the outside world much more closely than a contextual, relativist account. This will give him a more authentic and justified conception of morality, as it teaches him that moral conflict exists only because there is a reality to correspond to. It also explains and encourages another social phenomenon: social reform. In the relativist account, we automatically agree to the morals of whichever society we live in, for that is the framework applying to us. That could mean agreeing to an oppressive government and social discrimination, if present in our society. However once there is an absolutist standard, we have a yardstick by which to measure societal norms against, and create social reform if society is – by this yardstick – immoral. It allows the learning child to step out of his own social paradigm and morally assess the paradigm from an external perspective. This encourages him to follow in the footsteps of personalities such as Martin Luther King; slavery would not have been considered immoral in the relativist reading of morality, as it was a societal norm. Rather, stepping out of the paradigm and assessing the practice according to absolutist standards made its immorality clear. Through the absolutist reading, teaching our future generation to hold society morally responsible for its own practices would be a victory for character educations.

Thus, Walker et al (2015)’s genealogical account of character education described above can be a lesson to learn from. The obedient child, the hardworking child and the emotionally intelligent child are all good moral ideals to strive towards, but they describe only partial and incomplete aspects of human nature and so is not the best ideal to look to. We must strive towards a character education that nurtures all aspects of human nature.

The nature fulfilment account of moral absolutism also has great appeal. Young people often appear disengaged with moral discussions, seeing moral codes as paternalistic decrees from the upper echelons of society trying to control individuals’ lives (Kristjansson, 2013, pg 275). When morality is seen as a theory of self-interest, promoting one’s own wellbeing and elevating one to become the best possible version of oneself, the motivation is no longer from without, where an individual feels they are being made to conform to society’s expectations. Rather, there is deep motivation from within to flourish for one’s own sake, and the young person will dig deep within to develop the tools to do so.